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Johnson: Consequences of Somali Piracy

Introduction
While pirates have been the subject of numerous movies, books and plays—from
Robert Louis Stevenson’s timeless novel, Treasure Island, written in 1883; to the
classic Disney movie of the same title produced in 1950; to the recently released
“based-on-a-true story” film, Captain Phillips—the matter is hardly fictional.
With almost 1,200 prisoners taken captive by pirates from 2010 to 2011 and over
100 casualties in 2011 alone, it is evident that Somali piracy has made an
impeccable return in the twenty-first century.1
For millennia, actually dating back as early as 75 B.C., when Julius Caesar
found his life interrupted by a Sicilian piracy attack, pirates have plagued the sea,
violently attacking seafarers and greatly affecting transoceanic trade. 2 Authors
Homer and Cicero noted incidents “involving ancient Greek and Roman mariners”
and Western Europeans weathered Viking attacks during the Middle Ages. 3
However, the most notorious onslaughts occurred during the Golden Age of
Piracy (which spanned from 1570 to 1730). During this era, countries such as
Britain, France, and the United States, hired privateers to harass Spanish fleets
because of their frustration with Spanish dominance of the Caribbean.4 As Spain
continued to conquer and colonize the Americas, privateers quickly recognized
the vast presence of silver, gold, spices, and exotic goods aboard ships. Thus, the
harassment that privateers were commissioned for quickly made a transition to
lucrative pirate missions of travelling the sea for capital gains.
Due to enhanced onshore military surveillance during the 18th century, the
number of pirate attacks decreased sharply and the Golden Age of Piracy came to
an end. Additionally, the invention of the steam engine provided an alternative
mode of transportation that would mitigate travel by sea. With fewer boats
journeying through international waters, nations cut their naval patrol and began
investing money in new technologies. However, decades later, as international
trade increased following the Cold War, individuals soon began to recognize the

1

Peter Apps, “Somali Piracy Death Toll Rises as Violence Worsens,” Reuters, last modified June
22, 2012, accessed February 22, 2014, http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/06/22/us-somaliapiracy-idUSBRE85L08N20120622.
2
Robert Schlesinger, “Dealing with Pirates: How Julius Caesar Handled Things,” U.S. News and
World Report, last modified April 13, 2009, accessed November 9, 2013,
http://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/robert-schlesinger/2009/04/13/dealing-with-pirates-howjulius-caesar-handled-things.
3
Alex Altman, “A Brief History of Pirates,” TIME World, October 2, 2008, accessed November 9,
2013, http://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1846422,00.html.
4
Virginia Lunsford, “What Makes Piracy Work?” Proceedings Magazine 12 (2008): 1270,
accessed November 4, 2013, http://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2008-12/what-makespiracy-work.
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opportunities for capital gain through sea robbing.5 Thus, a form of crime that
many believed to be long dead has reappeared in the 21st century, causing
immense and costly problems to global trade and countries around the world.
In the last decade in particular, piracy in the African waters, especially
surrounding Somalia, has vastly increased. According to statistics supplied by the
International Maritime Bureau (IMB), the 219 attacks by Somali pirates in 2010
made up 49 percent of the total piracy attacks worldwide. In that same year,
Somali pirates hijacked 49 ships, while taking 1,016 seafarers hostage. However,
pirates never intend to harm their hostages, as their ultimate goal is always
seeking financial compensation. The One Earth Future Foundation (OEF)
approximates that the total ransom paid to Somali pirates reached $238 million in
just 2010 alone.6 A new study estimates that Somali pirates reaped as much as
$413 million in ransom payments from 154 hijackings from 2005 to 2012.7
The expansion of Somali piracy has caused immense amounts of harm on
the global trade market. It is estimated that the losses suffered globally range from
$1 billion to over $16 billion per year.8 Within this figure, only a small amount is
attributed to direct costs, such as paying ransom. The larger part of that figure
comes from indirect costs, such as delays/failure in delivering cargo (breach of
contract), reduction in the value of goods, or the extension of the ship rental and
staff salary. Additionally, piracy affects the willingness of seafarers to sail on
high-risk routes (e.g. the Gulf of Aden in the Horn of Africa). Thus, many
companies are battling the reality of staff refusing work. Effects such as these
ultimately cause financially detrimental consequences to companies. For example,
hijacked ships result in transportation delay, which ultimately leads to higher fuel
cost, increased wages for workers, and diminishes a company’s competitiveness.
Lastly, the threat of hijackings has coerced many shipping companies and shipowners to purchase more expensive insurance packages. Because of incidences of
piracy, many insurance companies now require a specific “kidnap and ransom”
policy, which can cover the cost of ransom and the arrangements required with
the payment.9
As studies show that the economic impacts of piracy are at an all-time
high, this paper will argue that the Somali pirates who infest the waters off the

5

Altman, “A Brief History of Pirates.”
Henk Rengelink, “Tackling Somali Piracy,” Trends in Organized Crime 3 (2012): 180-97,
accessed November 1, 2013, doi 10.1007/s12117-012-9171-3, 182-83.
7
The World Bank, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, and Interpol, Pirate Trails:
Tracking the Illicit Financial Flows from Pirate Activities off the Horn of Africa, Washington,
DC: The World Bank, 2013, accessed November 8, 2013,
https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/16196.
8
Rengelink, “Tackling Somali Piracy,” 185.
9
Ibid., 185-86.

6

https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/globaltides/vol8/iss1/5

2

Johnson: Consequences of Somali Piracy

Horn of Africa are causing significant financial damage to international
commerce by elevating global trade costs.

Rise of Piracy in Somalia
Due to a previous civil war, absence of central government, and lack of natural
resources, Somalia is presently one of the most underdeveloped and chaotic
countries in the world. It is widely believed that the inability to restore a
functioning government is the direct cause behind Somalia’s security problems
and ruined economy.10 Because of Somalia’s poor economic circumstances, many
individuals who are dissatisfied with the status quo seek unconventional ways to
improve their respective financial circumstances by any means possible. The poor
socioeconomic situation in the country paired with Somali citizens’ desperation to
alter their living conditions are the large stimuli in the rise and expansion of
piracy throughout international waters.
After the civil war, the country was left in mayhem with no formal
parliament for more than two decades.11 With anarchy spreading for years, it was
imperative to come up with a temporary solution for the well-being of the country.
Thus, in 2000, the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) was formed after
fourteen attempts to create a functioning government post-civil war. Although
Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed is the current president of Somalia and represents the
semi-success of the TFG, the party still lacks cohesion and control of the entire
country. 12 Particularly, the lawlessness has allowed Somali pirates to advance
their activities with protection of anarchist clans, and most recently the Jihad
militia Al-Shabaab that controls the Southern part of the country. According to
the International Maritime Bureau (IMB), while Somali pirates only initially
operated in the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean (within the vicinity of their
native country), the additional support they have gained has helped extend their
range as far away as 1200 sea miles from the capital of Mogadishu.13
Contrary to popular belief, Somali piracy did not begin initially out of the
desire to exploit the vulnerabilities of their failed, lawless state. Some of the first
low-scale pirate attacks carried out in the Horn of Africa acted as measures to
counter illegal fishing in Somali waters. After a civil war erupted in the country in
10

Christopher L Daniels, Somali Piracy and Terrorism in the Horn of Africa (Lanham: Scarecrow
Press, 2012), 1.
11
BBC Monitoring, “News Africa,” BBC News, last modified July 4, 2013, accessed November
10, 2013, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-14094503.
12
Stephanie Hanson and Eben Kaplan, “Somalia's Transitional Government,” Council on Foreign
Relations, last modified May 12, 2008, accessed November 10, 2013,
http://www.cfr.org/somalia/somalias-transitional-government/p12475.
13
Rengelink,”Tackling Somali Piracy,” 183-85.
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1991, the last functioning government faced a collapse. Consequently, the 2,000
miles of Somali coastline appeared open for foreign vessels to intrude and plunder
the fisheries, due to lack of government security.14 Not only is its coastline the
longest in Africa, it is also rich with shrimp, lobster, tuna, and many other
valuable sea products.15 Yet the vast potential of the industry was never brought
to fruition because the country lacked laws to ensure the safeguard of the
seaboard. The government absence also caused the once reliable Somali
coastguard to vanish, as there was no budget to support their presence.
Consequently, the Somali waters became a site of an international free-for-all,
with numerous fishing fleets from around the world illegally plundering the
country’s stocks and freezing out Somalia’s own rudimentarily-equipped
fishermen. 16 With the nonexistence of government policy and stable economic
structure, Somalia was, and is still, unable to effectively combat the crimes of
illegal fishing.
As many countries began to realize Somalia’s lack of ability to
appropriately counter the frequent theft in their waters, Yemeni fisherman became
the most prominent group to illegally fish off Somalia’s coast. There are various
claims that state that Yemeni fisherman would dismantle and/or steal Somali
fishing nets for their respective gains. 17 Another UN report asserts that an
estimate of $300 million worth of seafood is stolen from Somalia’s coastline
annually.18 As a result, Somali fisherman began using small boats and weapons in
order to accost the Yemeni fisherman, forcing them to throw the fish overboard.
Moreover, they would also confront other potential ships suspected of illegal
fishing, and hold the crew hostage until they paid a fine for deterrence.
Although these attacks originally began out of desperation to save local
fishing industries, Somali piracy ultimately grew into an international problem as
their waters became not only overfished, but also polluted by illegally dumped,
harmful waste.19 In 2005, the United Nations Environmental Program reported the
presence of uranium radioactive and other hazardous deposits in the water, which
led to a rash of respiratory ailments and skin diseases breaking out in villages
along the Somali coast. At the time of the report, the UN cited that “it cost $2.50
per ton for a European company to dump these types of materials off the Horn of

14

Ishaan Tharoor, “How Somalia's Fishermen Become Pirates,” TIME World, April 18, 2009,
accessed November 9, 2013, http://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1892376,00.html.
15
Daniels, Somali Piracy, 33.
16
Tharoor, “How Somalia’s Fishermen Become Pirates.”
17
Jonathan Beloff, “How Piracy is Affecting Economic Development in Puntland, Somalia,”
Journal of Strategic Security 1 (2013): 47-54, accessed March 4, 2014, doi
http://dx.doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.6.1.4. 47.
18
Tharoor, “How Somalia’s Fishermen Become Pirates.”
19
Beloff, “How Piracy is Affecting Economic Development,” 47-48.
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Africa, as opposed to $250 per ton to dispose of them cleanly in Europe.”20 The
blatantly egregious acts of other countries went virtually unchecked throughout
the entire 1990s.21 As these events began to culminate, it was evident that Somali
fishermen had to start looking out for themselves and their own financial
stability—and they did this through piracy.

International Implications of the Attacks
The maritime piracy attacks that transpire off the Horn of Africa are severely
disrupting international trade. The Far East-Europe route is one of the world’s
most active transcontinental maritime routes, as it receives nearly 20 percent of all
global trading activities and more than 80 percent of trade moves through the Gulf
of Aden. More specifically, more than 20,000 ships carrying most of the world’s
affordable clothing, crude oil, and dry commodities pass through this route
annually.22 However, on this route, there is an important barrier by the Puntland
area in northeast Somalia. As self-ruling clans and warlords govern that unstable
region, the adjacent Gulf of Aden harbors copious amounts of Somali pirates.
Their main goals are to hijack ships and seize the transported goods, holding them
until companies pay the ransom in order to retrieve their cargo and crewmembers.
Consequently, this route adequately reflects the significant impacts of maritime
piracy on global shipping and world development.23
The financial implications of maritime piracy are widespread. With a lack of
central government, Somali pirates exploit their surrounding waters, leaving the
cargo frequently transported between Europe and Asia endangered. One major
implication is that the attacks have forced major shipping companies to adjust
their routes from the Far East to Europe. For example, many companies are
altering their courses from the Gulf of Aden to the Cape of Good Hope or the
Suez Canal in order to decrease the likelihood of pirate attacks. Such changes add
significant additional costs. Attacks have created extra costs for fuel and higher
insurance premiums, which ultimately create an additional burden on consumers
in the form of higher prices for their goods.24 It is estimated that if one-third of the

20

Tharoor, “How Somalia’s Fishermen Become Pirates.”
Daniels, Somali Piracy, 35.
22
Graham Cooke, “Oceania | Security,” The Diplomat, last modified February 2, 2009, accessed
November 9, 2013, http://thediplomat.com/2009/02/02/the-impact-of-somali-piracy/?all=true.
23
Xiaowen Fu, Yui-Yip Lau, and Adolf K.Y. Ng, “The Impacts of Maritime Piracy on Global
Economic Development: The Case of Somalia,” Maritime Policy & Management 7 (2010):
Accessed November 7, 2013, 677-97, doi 10.1080/03088839.2010.524736, 677-81.
24
Ibid., 678.
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Far-East European cargo routes were diverted via the Cape of Good Hope, it
would trigger $7.5 billion extra in expenses worldwide.25
The timeliness of shipments and delayed delivery of transported cargo is
another consequence that stems from pirate attacks and the necessity of rerouting
vessels. Unfortunately, the uncertainty of receiving scheduled cargo creates often
deters companies, thus significantly decreases trade opportunities. While it is
difficult to study the effects of insecurity, many studies have been done that
demonstrate that more transparency about the measures being used to combat
piracy will result in higher volumes of trade. Ultimately, piracy can significantly
affect the gross domestic product of countries whose trade it disrupts.26
Through data analysis and empirical application, it was discovered that the
number of hijackings is the most relevant variable to the economic effects of
piracy. Studies show that each increase in the number of attacks indefinitely
hinders the amount of exports of a country. More specifically, these studies found
that the effect of an additional hijacked vessel can decrease a country’s exports by
about 1.1 percent. The study found that trade losses due to piracy attacks between
Europe and Asia total $24.5 billion in just 2008 alone.27
In an additional study done by the same authors, the percentage of piracy
acts by Somali pirates is compared to incidents involving Malaccan pirates
(competitors of Somali pirates that plague the Strait of Malacca), specifically on
the Europe-East Asia trade route. From 1999 to 2008, there was a clear increase in
the amount of Somali hijackings, juxtaposed to a sharp decline in Malaccan pirate
attacks. Losses in trade caused by Somali pirates multiplied by six from 1999 to
2008, while the losses caused by Malaccan pirates were reduced by one-quarter.28
Since 2009, major economic powerhouses have begun deploying naval
forces along the Gulf of Aden in order to protect shipments transported on the Far
East-Europe route. Data demonstrates that the absence of government intervention
is a large factor in the rise of piracy attacks. From 2007 to 2008, piracy incidents
rose by seven times, which undeniably could have been mitigated with better
administration involvement. If the governments had not interfered, total traffic
volumes would have reduced by 30.25 percent, solidifying the theory that
maritime piracy in Somalia is truly affecting global shipping companies’ regular
activity. While the affected costs vary, the overall economic welfare loss is
substantially superior, as it entails the losses due to reduction in traffic volumes
and efficiency loss due to using an alternative route. Considering that 80 percent
25

Ibid., 678-79.
Sami Bensassi and Inmaculada Martínez-Zarzoso, “How Costly is Modern Maritime Piracy to
the International Community?” Review of International Economics 5 (2012): 869-83, accessed
November 5, 2013, doi 10.1111/roie.12000, 869-72.
27
Ibid., 876-78.
28
Ibid., 879.
26
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of current international trade is transported by sea, a reduction in these trips can
bring shocking consequences to the global economy.29
Overall, the empirical analysis demonstrated an expected annual loss of
$30 billion on the various countries that utilize the Gulf of Aden shipping route.
Thus, it is imperative for governments and international organizations to take up
effective measures against modern maritime piracy, as the economic stakes are
extremely pertinent to the health of the global economy.30

Domestic Implications of Piracy:
Although Somali piracy attacks are often only regarded by the international
community because of their impact on global trade, the effects of these organized
attacks in Somalia itself are frequently ignored. While there is no singular cause
to the rise of piracy in the Puntland area and the rest of the Horn of Africa, it is
widely accepted that the economic hardships in the country cause Somali citizens
to seek extreme measures of survival through piracy. Interestingly, the successes
of Somali piracy attacks have resulted in short-term positive financial impacts on
the country’s economy, specifically through the creation of secondary businesses
in the region. Mainly, citizens can take advantage of Somali piracy by: becoming
a “foot soldier,” completing skilled work for the pirates, financing the attacks, or
handling the fiscal matters after the attacks are successful.
As piracy attempts are regarded as high-risk, there is high demand for
low-level pirates that are able and willing to carry out hijackings. These “foot
soldiers” are sent to sea with crewmembers with the sole purpose of locating
valuable vessels to seize. Once these low-level pirates successfully take control
over a boat, their task is to return to shore, as it is necessary for a negotiator (also
known as an “interpreter”) to assess the value of assets aboard. The World Bank
reports that interpreters are paid $10,000 to $30,000 US for their services.31 If the
low-level pirates successfully hijack the ship, they are compensated accordingly
for their services. It is estimated that “foot soldiers” receive $30,000 to $75,000
per raid, but no more than 2.5 percent of the total ransom payment. 32 An
additional bonus of $5,000 is given to the first man who boards the ship—as the
individual who initiates close contact first has the most risk of dying before his
other counterparts.33 However, Matlock also mentions that in the event that these
29

Ibid., 878.
Ibid., 880.
31
The World Bank et al., Pirate Trails.
32
Carol Matlack, “Inside Somali Piracy,” Bloomberg Businessweek, November 6, 2013, accessed
November 9, 2013, http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2013-11-06/inside-somali-piracy-inc.
33
Beloff, “How Piracy is Affecting Economic Development,” 50.
30
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low-level workers received a cash advance before the attack, they are charged 100
percent interest on compensation.
Unfortunately, these workers rarely use their illegally acquired assets for
building a sturdy life for themselves. The World Bank study notes that the most
commonly reported expenses of these individuals are for sex workers or slaves,
alcohol, and expensive cars. Additionally, after deductions are made from trip
expenses (food and fines for bad behavior), the “foot soldiers” are left with littleto-no money, requiring them to participate in additional attacks, perpetuating the
problem further.34
Aside from the need for “foot soldiers,” there is also a large market for
individuals able to meet the vast consumer interests of pirates. Mainly, they
require workers to help the pirates attain the ostentatious lifestyle they have
worked so hard to display. For example, there is a large market for foreign cars
and speedboats, which creates positions for sales people and mechanics as a
counter necessity. In addition, to accommodate pirates’ desire for flamboyant
homes on the coastline, various professionals are needed to make their dreams
come to reality. Thus, business opportunities for local professional carpenters,
electricians, gardeners, and suppliers become available.35 Additional employment
opportunities are available for local bookkeepers that are able to aid successful
pirates smuggle, transfer, or launder their ransom payments.
Canadian freelance journalist Jay Bahadur, who frequently writes about
Somali piracy notes, “as in any pyramid scheme, the clear winner is the man at
the top.” 36 Thus, venture capitalists possess the most fundamental role in all
piracy attacks. These financiers invest initial funds in boats, supplies, and lowlevel pirates in order to pioneer the piracy onslaughts. 37 These investors
reportedly collect 30-70 percent of the ransom payments, depending on their
initial investment. It is common for sole investors to receive as much as 50
percent of the ill-gotten gains, due to the financial risks they undertake upon
primary backing.38
Although there may be short-term financial benefits of Somali piracy, the
World Bank study demonstrates that the presence of ransom payments is only
continuing to ruin the Somali economy. Contrary to popular belief, most of the
money secured from piracy attacks stays in the country. As most financiers are
warlords, they use their capital to “pay for private militias, buy political protection,
34

The World Bank et al., Pirate Trails.
Andrew Carlson, “Pirates of Puntland, Somalia,” Origins: Current Events in Historical
Perspective 9 (2009), accessed November 9, 2013, doi http://origins.osu.edu/print/70.
36
Jay Bahadur, Deadly Waters: Inside the Hidden World of Somalia's Pirates, (London:
HarperCollins Publishers, 2011).
37
Matlack, “Inside Somali Piracy.”
38
The World Bank et al., Pirate Trails.
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and reinvest in new pirate operations.” Additionally, these individuals use these
funds to invest in legitimate, diversified business opportunities such as real estate
and hotels. The issue with this underground economy is that money coming in the
country remains untaxed. 39 If there were an official, structured government
present within the country, the illegal money that pirates and their accomplices
control would be circulated with the economy and it would be taxed. As a result,
the Somali government would be able to provide adequate resources for
infrastructure, education, and potential redistribution of wealth through subsidies
and government assistance.
Though Somali pirates’ violent attacks clearly have vast financial impacts
on their own country’s economic structure and global trade costs, these criminals
truly believe they are doing their country a great service. In an interview with
Sugule Ali, an infamous Puntland Pirate, he described his work as nationalistic.
Ali claims that Puntland pirates do not see themselves as sea bandits and urges the
world to see them as a coast guard patrolling their seas.40

Addressing Somali Piracy & Proposed Resolutions
As the prevalence of Somali pirate attacks continues to drastically affect the
global economy, it is essential that the international community work diligently to
prevent further attacks. The resurgence of maritime piracy in the twenty-first
century has forced the United Nations Security Council to confront the issue of
piracy head-on in recent years. Since its reemergence, a slew of recommendations,
resolutions, and security mitigation tactics have been employed in order to reduce
the risk of attacks. In the past, the Security Council Resolutions advised
individual states to discipline the pirates. For example, the United Nations
Security Council Resolution 1816 (2008) “condemns the acts of piracy taking
place off the coast of Somalia and calls for nations to take action both on land and
at sea to alleviate the problem.” 41 This declaration not only condemns and
deplores all acts of piracy, it also provides states with various tools to handle the
issue. Some of the advice includes urging states with naval vessels to deter using
high-risk routes, share information about acts of piracy with other nations and the
International Maritime Organization, and calls upon states to cooperate in

39

Matlack, “Inside Somali Piracy.”
Carlson, “Pirates of Puntland, Somalia.”
41
United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1816 (2008): The Situation in Somalia, June 2
2008, http://daccess-ddsny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N08/361/77/PDF/N0836177.pdf?OpenElement.
40
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determining jurisdiction; for example, prosecuting individuals responsible for acts
of piracy.42
Although this provided states with preliminary advice for how to act on
the situation, a new, resolution achieved on April 27, 2010, goes further to
address the issue of what to do with pirates after their arrest. Because the topic lay
dormant for many years, the procedure for effective punishment was not clear.
The Security Council calls on “all states to criminalize piracy under national laws.”
Essentially, this decree stated that failure to prosecute individuals who committed
acts of piracy demonstrated a public undermining of anti-piracy efforts. Thus, the
council implores countries to criminalize piracy in their domestic laws and
provide effective jurisprudence for these wanton actions.43
Because of the failed government in Somalia, the pirates in the Gulf of
Aden essentially do as they please. A senior economist in the World Bank’s
research department states, “piracy is a symptom of Somalia’s political system.”44
Due to the anarchy in the country and the inability of officials to control the
territorial waters, Somali pirates have expanded their attacks—capturing some the
world’s largest ships and acquiring millions of dollars in ransom.45 Thus, it is key
to “go after the system, not just the pirates.” 46 While the Transitional Federal
Government made an attempt to govern the country, it is clear that Somalia needs
additional aid from a number of developed countries in order to truly eliminate
the problem. As it is evident that Somali citizens are turning to these crimes due
to poor economic stability, a viable financial system needs to be established in
order to provide alternative means of livelihood. The overall goal of onshore
preventative measures must be to eliminate the source of the problem – the
desperation that compels Somali citizens to engage in acts of piracy. 47 An
example of preventative onshore efforts can be the proactive outreach to Somali
youth that discourages them from seeing piracy as their only means to success.48
While the United Nations and other non-governmental organizations have made
efforts to decrease piracy through policy changes and restructuring the

42

Daniels, Somali Piracy, 176-79.
Danielle Archibugi and Mariana Chiarugi, “Looking for a Jurisdiction for Somali Pirates,”
Political Quarterly 2 (2011): 231-39, accessed November 1, 2013, doi: 10.1111/j.1467923X.2011.02193.x. 231.
44
Quy-Toan Do, “Ending Somali Piracy: Go After the System, Not Just the Pirates,” The World
Bank, last modified April 11, 2013, accessed November 9, 2013,
http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2013/04/11/ending-somali-piracy-go-after-the-systemnot-just-the-pirates.
45
Archibugi and Chiarugi, “Looking for a Jurisdiction for Somali Pirates,” 231.
46
Do, “Ending Somali Piracy.”
47
Beloff, “How Piracy is Affecting Economic Development,” 53.
48
The World Bank et al., Pirate Trails.
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government within Somalia, most of the efforts to combat these crimes take place
offshore.
While the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Law of the Sea established the
responsibility of nations in their use of the ocean and creates appropriate principle
for transoceanic trade, the United Nations Security Council Resolutions go more
in depth about the ability of nations to prosecute suspected pirates. Any state has
the authority to seize a ship suspected of infiltration by pirates, and bring the
individuals to its territory for a trial in its respective court. However, Western
navies often are too complacent in their punishment of pirates and states are
seldom comfortable using these powers and often fail to seek prosecution.49 Often,
even if the pirates are caught by naval patrol, the suspected pirates are able to
return back to their country’s shoreline without penalty. Many countries prefer to
decline jurisprudence, as they are deterred by costs and an ambiguous code of
conduct, which appears to leave the crime without reprimand.50
The IMB estimates that about half of piracy attacks go unreported due to
the inconvenience and slow nature of successful investigations. 51 Many
researchers argue that the NATO Operation Ocean Shield possesses no
framework to appropriately deal with the discipline of pirates, especially
concerning their arrest and trial. Thus, attempted piracy attacks have doubled as
pirates recognize the lack of consequences. Approximations show that there are
only 1,000 to 3,000 at sea. Therefore, the arrest and trial of these individuals
would make an increase in the impacts of piracy on world development.52
This has led to a search for an effective, cheaper solution for the
punishment of pirates. For example, a common practice is the signing of bilateral
agreements with states to address the technical needs of the trial.53 For example,
many trials related to piracy were taking place in Kenya. During a brief period,
the country’s judicial system was overburdened; however, the international
community increased funding and two months later, a newly improved courtroom
was opened in Mombasa.54
Piracy in the Gulf of Aden has transformed from acts of despair to fullblown organized crime. The leaders of the crime ring frequently stay at home,
while they have their manpower execute the acts on their behalf, and they remain
unpunished. It is undeniable that to effectively combat Somali piracy their

49

Archibugi and Chiarugi, “Looking for a Jurisdiction for Somali Pirates,” 233-34.
Ibid., 231-32.
51
Ibid., 231-33.
52
Ibid., 231-33.
53
Ibid., 234.
54
Ibid., 235.
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government system must be rebuilt and justice must be rendered on Somali
territory.55

Conclusion
It is irrefutable that the government instability, shattered economy, and violence
present in Somalia pose internal threats as well as threats to the international
community. As Somalia’s coastal waters remain unprotected and overfished, and
its government prone to Islamic insurgence, Somalia is notorious as one of the
most impoverished and dangerous nations according to a 2006 Forbes report.56
The country has demonstrated minimal growth since the civil war in 1991, forcing
Somali citizens to act out of desperation in order to survive. As this paper
demonstrates, studying the country’s current economic and political environment
and as well as its history is pivotal to understanding how the volatility in Somalia
led to the development of organized pirate attacks off the Horn of Africa. Piracy
in the Gulf of Aden has evolved from erratic acts of despair to full-blown
organized crime. Even since the establishment of the Transitional Federal
Government, piracy attacks have rapidly increased, with record numbers of
incidents beginning in 2005. Without government intervention, Somali piracy
cannot be effectively combated. The Somali government must be rebuilt and
justice must be rendered on Somali territory.57
While the international community is attempting to combat the issue of
piracy in the Gulf of Aden through enhanced surveillance and naval patrols, there
has been no visible decrease in piracy behavior thus far. Piracy continues to be the
main source of income for many coastal communities in Somalia, as many pirates
do not fear the consequences of being apprehended.58 Because it is very costly to
exert jurisdiction, Somali pirates remain unfazed by their actions, as they often
returned to their home country with minimal repercussions. Thus, many shipping
companies are left to deal with piracy attacks on their own, resulting in billions of
dollars lost in annual trade. It is undeniable that as long as Somalia remains
impoverished, with no repercussions for suspected pirates, these attacks will
continue to occur at a greater rate, while simultaneously elevating global trade
costs—affecting consumers’ pockets worldwide.
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